A longstanding constant of US trade policy (and one that survived the Trump presidency) was rocked a couple of weeks ago. The US withdrew from its previous position in negotiations on digital trade at the World Trade Organization, saying that the right to regulate was more important than pushing for the free cross-border movement of data. The Biden administration has always been keener on reining in Big Tech than was either Obama’s or Trump’s. Its new stance is closer to the position the EU has long taken — that privacy is a fundamental right, and the ability to regulate it is not to be bargained away in trade deals.
The Biden administration has always been keener on reining in Big Tech than was either Obama’s or Trump’s. Its new stance is closer to the position the EU has long taken — that privacy is a fundamental right, and the ability to regulate it is not to be bargained away in trade deals.
In theory, together with a general move towards tighter rules on the use of personal data, at least at state level, it looks as if the different US and EU regulatory philosophies — laissez faire versus tough privacy protection — are converging somewhat. (This trend has already been identified by the guru in this area, Columbia University’s Anu Bradford)...
To answer this we turn to Susan Aaronson of George Washington University, who’s often to be found pushing out the boundaries of creative thinking on digital trade and the like. Here’s her latest paper on the subject — an earlier piece from Trade Secrets favourite Dan Ciuriak is also worth a read.
Aaronson’s take is that the case for including data flow and digital trade in trade agreements is strongly conflicted. There’s a good argument from the practical and institutional point of view. Trade deals are legally binding and have provisions to arbitrate disputes, unlike the softer guidelines that emerge from discussions in places such as the OECD.
Read the full article in Financial Times.